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“The bandages signify death,” says Derrida, “the condemnation to 
death; when they fall away, out of use, undone, untied, untying, they 
signify, like a detached signifier, that the dead one is resuscitated.”1 Like a 
detached signifier, indicating a metaphorical relationship between 
signification and the bandages.  But, when we follow the metonymy of 
bandages in Derrida’s The Death Penalty: Volume 1, the bandages appear as 
the figure for figuration itself.  More specifically, they are a sign that needs 
interpretation; a sign that the bandages are detached from the body; a sign 
that the word, or sign, is detached from the thing.  Let’s begin by looking at 
where the bandages first appear in the seminar, to what they are attached 
and from what they are detached. 
In the First Session (December 8, 1999 continued), Derrida begins where 
Jean Genet begins Our Lady of the Flowers, with a photograph from a 
newspaper of a condemned man named Weidmann, whose head is shown 
“swaddled in white bandages,” a picture that Derrida remembers seeing as a 
child.  Discussing the passage from Genet, Derrida immediately focuses on 
the religious images and sacralization of the condemned that take us back to 
Christ’s execution on the cross.  The sacred image of Christ on the cross 
reappears throughout the seminar, especially in Derrida’s discussions of the 
metaphorics of Victor Hugo’s abolitionism.  Derrida shows how the history 
of abolitionism, and the history of the death penalty, share the same 
theological underpinnings and the same attachment to a value beyond 
embodied finite life.  The bandages, then, become the first sign that both 
sides of the debate are tied to religion, specifically Christianity.  On the one 
hand, even the most secular abolitionist literature has religious undertones.  
And, on the other, the most rigorous philosophy cannot ground the death 
penalty without at least implicitly appealing to the sovereign authority of 
God. The death penalty and religion are bound together, represented by the 
bandages of the executed and resurrected Christ.   
Derrida suggests that we follow the metonymy of the bandages to see 
the connection between Christ and images of condemned men ascending to 
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the gallows in Genet and in the 1958 film Elevator to the Gallows.2  But we 
could just as well look to contemporary media, for example, to the portrayal 
of Troy Davis as a martyr whose spirituality lifted him above his impending 
execution, or to a recent editorial in The Guardian that described the 
condemned Dennis McGuire as Christlike with his arms spread out and 
bound to the gurney as if on the cross.   We can follow the metonymy of 
these bindings, these straps attached to the table, as threads that lead from 
contemporary scenes of execution back to the execution of Christ. 
Derrida describes Christ’s bandages, lying empty by the tomb, as a 
signifier of both death and resurrection.  He reads those empty bandages as 
a sign of the absent body as dead--or corpse--and gone—or resurrected.  
“Like a detached signifier,” the bandages signify both death and the 
overcoming of death when they are “raised up, erected by a miracle, a 
divine miracle or a poetic miracle.”3   Derrida focuses on the Gospel of John 
where Mary Magdalene sees the empty wrappings and asks Jesus, whom 
she supposes to be the gardener, where they have taken the body.  In this 
moment, the bandages signal a threat “worse than death,” the desecration or 
disappearance of Christ’s body, which Derrida compares to the disappeared 
in Chile or South Africa.  And yet in the Gospel, they also signal a promise, 
namely, the hope of the messianic miracle of Christ’s coming and going and 
coming again, what Derrida cleverly calls the “Fort/Da-sein of Christ.”4.  In 
this moment, these dried leaves of linen are all the evidence Mary has to 
decipher what happened to the body, thus begins the mystery of the missing 
body, a thread we could follow up to scholastic debates over whether or not 
we will have bodies in heaven.  
Not recognizing Jesus’s liminal body standing before her, neither alive 
nor resurrected, Mary asks: “What happened to the body?”  She is trying to 
fathom the meaning of the empty bandages.  She is weeping because she 
interprets those empty bandages as a bad sign, but Jesus reassures her that 
the bandages are a good sign, a sign of his resurrection to come, of his 
imminent ascendance unto God.  In fact, it is only because the bandages are 
detached that they can signal resurrection.  Like a detached signifier, the 
meaning of the bandages is ambiguous, or at least multivalent. Certainly this 
is the case with the bandages in Derrida’s seminar, where he exploits their 
multiple meanings.  The French verb bander means to band, to bandage, to 
blindfold, to tighten, and to get a hard on.  And all of these meanings are 
operating in the seminar.  And sometimes we see them pop up when we 
least expect.  For example, in Derrida’s analysis of religion, with its roots in 
the Latin religio meaning the ties that bind; or the recurring theme of 
fascination, from fascio, meaning to tense, tie, attach (in Italian it means 
bundle or rod, unity, the root of the word Fascism), fasciola is wrapping or 
bandage; or all of his talk of filiation and blood ties, fils [fis] meaning sons 
and fil meaning threads in French.  So many threads to follow in this text, 
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opening onto so many promising interpretations, wrapped around the death 
penalty.  
In the space of this essay, I don’t have time to unpack all of these 
bandages, so I focus on the first time that they appear and more specifically 
on the timing of that first time, a first time, it turns out, that is repeated.  I 
focus on an interruption of time lodged in these bandages, which is perhaps 
the sign of the very possibility of changing time, or of changing times.  Once 
we start to unwrap these inaugural bandages, we encounter an odd moment 
in the seminar, a kind of liminal moment, dangling like a detached signifier, 
or a stutter, that interrupts the flow of the seminar, which is already not so 
much flowing as constantly interrupting itself.  Derrida’s style is one of 
interruption.  He repeatedly interrupts his remarks by quoting very long 
passages allowing the voice of the other to penetrate his own, and 
subsequently interrupting them with his own remarks; in addition, 
sometimes he begins a session with a quotation, presented, as we might 
imagine, live in his own voice, as if they were his words, which of course 
they both are and are not.  For example, session four begins with Derrida 
saying, “I vote for the pure, simple, and definitive abolition of the death 
penalty,” which we find out are actually the words of Victor Hugo.  The 
time of the seminar builds suspense as we wait to learn who is speaking.  
But that question--who is speaking--takes us back to Christ’s tomb and the 
liminal figure of the undead Jesus, between condemnation and resurrection, 
between death and eternal life, unrecognizable, who comes along to 
interrupt Mary’s reveries over the empty bandages.   
The first instant, so to speak, of interruption, is the sudden appearance 
of the bandages at the very moment when Derrida takes up the question of 
why to begin a seminar on the death penalty with literature, presumably 
rather than with philosophy or legal discourse, or some other principles.5  
Discussing the second apparition of the bandages in the Gospel of John, 
Derrida says:  
The bandages do indeed appear; they are there all of a 
sudden; they leap into the light…the process is very 
remarkable (and if we had the leisure to do so [that is to 
say, if we had the time], …we would meditate on this time 
of the bandages as the lodging made ready for literature, 
for an ascension without ascension, an elevation without 
elevation, an imminent but not yet accomplished 
resurrection.6    
The bandages as interruption.  They interrupt time.  The bandages as the 
lodging made ready for literature.  What could this mean?  Like a detached 
signifier, those bandages house an alternative temporality, perhaps an 
alternative to either the redemptive time of resurrection or the clock time of 
condemnation.  Between condemnation and resurrection lay the bandages, a 
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sign of an in between time, a time of interruption and repetition, an undead 
time, what Derrida calls a “singular time that does not belong to the 
ordinary unfolding of time.”7 
Biblical bandages show up again in Session Four when Derrida is 
discussing Blanchot’s “Literature and the Right to Death.” After making the 
debatable claim that Blanchot implicitly supports the death penalty, Derrida 
qualifies his analysis, not wanting to be “unjust” or “condemn” Blanchot’s 
text to death.  This is when he brings up Lazarus as another figure whose 
bandages signal both death and resurrection.  Again, those bandages are 
tied to literature--perhaps too tightly for Derrida’s taste--when Blanchot 
suggests that the object of literature is precisely what literature necessarily 
kills in order to exist, in other words, the thing as it exists before it is 
represented in language.  “The language of literature is the search for this 
moment that precedes literature,” says Blanchot, an impossible moment, a 
time before time.  The smelly body of Lazarus before he is resurrected, this is 
what literature seeks, the body in between death and resurrection.  In the 
story of Lazarus, however, the bandages are still attached to the body, unlike 
the detached bandages at Christ’s tomb.  So too, Blanchot insists that 
literature is attached to the body, the missing body, which can never be 
recovered as it was before its resurrection in language.  Perhaps, then, 
Blanchot’s literary signifier is not detached enough from the body to offer 
the possibility of an alterative to the discourse of condemnation and 
resurrection with its redemptive temporality.  With Lazarus, there is no 
mystery of the empty bandages, only the miracle of resurrection.  Yes, 
literature can cling to the body.  Yes, literature can proclaim its own truth 
and sovereignty.  Yes, literature can support the death penalty.  But, is there 
another possibility for literature, or if not literature, then the literary or 
poetic? What happens the signifier becomes detached, fluid, and 
multivalent?  
Can the literary or poetic interrupt redemptive temporalities as well as 
clock time with its infinite division of time into discrete manageable 
moments?  Is there a way in which the literary and poetic as detached 
signifiers offer a different time lodged in those bandages, the time between 
condemnation and resurrection, what Derrida calls “this singular time that 
does not belong to the ordinary unfolding of time,” “this time without 
time”?8  If, as Derrida suggests, there will always be condemnation, fueled at 
least in part by fantasies of resurrection, is there any time (or place) that 
resists being condemned to death and the phantasm of resurrection?  And 
could the bandages as a detached signifier offer a clue to this alternate 
temporality?   
How might the detached bandages signal an alternative to, or time in 
between, condemnation and resurrection?  In their second appearance in the 
Gospel of John, they become a sign of an in between time for Christ’s body 
when it is already dead but not yet resurrected, a sort of undead Christ who 
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haunts his tomb like an apparition or a ghost.  The bandages signify that 
Christ is dead, but no longer dead.  We could say that he will have been 
condemned or he will have been resurrected, employing the future anterior 
tense, which reminds us that how we inherit the past determines how we 
live the future.  This time of the future anterior is a time out of joint, always 
both too early and too late, which, we could say is the time of interpretation 
itself. 
In psychoanalytic terms, we could say that our existence as 
interpretative beings, or beings who mean, is a living wound resulting from 
the trauma of this split between being and meaning.  As compensation for 
the loss of being-- immediate and present--we have meaning, detached and 
absenting.  This time of loss and compensation operates not according to 
linear clock time but rather to the time of repetition, the time of the drives, 
the time of Freud’s condensation and displacement.  This experience 
becomes incorporated into clock time, always with remainder, always 
incomplete, always with excess, as part of a story, a narrative that we tell 
and retell in order to make sense of things.  Making sense of things both kills 
and resurrects those things, those bodies, which we attempt to grasp 
through meaning.  And for better and worse, we are left holding empty 
bandages, detached signifiers, asking what they mean and where’s the body.  
The time of interpretation, in between time, before we know what it means, 
the pile of bandages lying there, signaling something, but what?  In 
Derrida’s seminar, they come to signify the time of literature itself as a time 
of interruption, a singular time outside of normal calculable clock time. 
From the very beginning literature appears as an interruption to 
philosophical justifications of capital punishment.  In response to the 
question “Why, on the death penalty, begin with literature?”, Derrida 
immediately presents a hypothesis: modern literature, in spite of its 
heterogeneity on the issue, is decidedly abolitionist.9  He is quick to point 
out that although there are many writers who take abolitionist stances, and 
others who do not, what is unique about literature is not just that its modern 
history includes abolitionists, but rather that its modern history is also 
essentially the history of “a desacralization” that breaks with biblical notions 
of forgiveness, and we might add, biblical notions of divine authority, 
sovereignty and truth.10  Derrida seems to link this desacralization with the 
birth of the novel and fiction, which, is associated with irony rather than the 
sacred and with self-referentiality rather than an appeal to a transcendent 
authority or God.  With fiction, we could say that the signifier becomes 
detached from transcendent authority and transcendent sovereignty.  Fiction 
destabilizes the proper or the properly philosophical principle.11  Implied in 
Derrida’s analysis is the bond between detaching the signifier from 
transcendent truth and abolishing the death penalty.   
Can literature, or if not literature, then the literary or poetic interrupt 
both redemptive temporalities and clock time with its infinite division of 
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time into discrete manageable moments?  Is there a way in which the literary 
or what Derrida calls poetic sovereignty operate as detached signifiers, offer 
a different time lodged in those bandages, the time between condemnation 
and resurrection? If, as Derrida suggests, there will always be 
condemnation, fueled at least in part by fantasies of resurrection, is there 
any time that resists being condemned to death and the phantasm of 
resurrection?  And could the bandages as a detached signifier offer a clue to 
this alternate temporality?          
As Derrida writes in the margin of the typescript of Session One, “No 
philosophy against the death penalty,” which echoes his remarks in For 
What Tomorrow that “no philosophical discourse as such, and in its 
philosophical systematicity, has ever condemned the death penalty” and 
that therefore “an abolitionist discourse based on pure principle has yet to 
be elaborated.”12.  Using the hyperbolic rhetoric of “never before,” which 
makes uncanny appearances throughout his later work, Derrida claims that 
never before has a philosopher qua philosopher made a principled 
argument against the death penalty.  Certainly, this “fact” would be a good 
reason to start an analysis of abolitionist discourse with literature.   
But, I think that perhaps there is a deeper reason to begin with modern 
literature and not modern philosophy when it comes to the death penalty, a 
reason that revolves around those bandages as detached signifiers.  Perhaps 
the literary and poetic, rather than literature as a discipline per se, could be 
modes of reading and writing, rather than a corpus.  When writing becomes 
a corpus, it is dead, canonical, like a sovereignty based on principles.  But, 
literary and poetic sovereignty, what Derrida calls in The Beast and the 
Sovereign, “poetic majesty”, might offer an alternative insofar as it demands 
ways of reading and writing that open up rather than close off possibilities.  
Yes, the literary and poetic can seduce, but as Derrida’s Blanchot argues it 
can never seduce absolutely; unlike philosophy, at its best, it seduces with 
its fluidity rather than its rigidity.  Perhaps a certain poetic or literary 
sovereignty can resist the fantasy of sovereign mastery insofar as it requires 
interpretation and reinterpretation, insofar as it does not erect, or resurrect, 
itself as the one and only, the grand master, the sovereign truth or principle.  
Even if it makes those bandages stand out, stand erect, or band erect, as 
“bander” is translated in Glas, literature is unable to erect itself as the one 
true transcendental signifier attached to all others the way that philosophy 
has done.   
Whereas modern literature—or perhaps I should say the literary or 
poetic—gives us figures and fantasies as such, wrapped up in so many 
bandages, suggesting both death and resurrection, but never, in fact, 
delivering either, modern philosophy mistakes the bandages for the body in 
itself.   Simply put, if modern literature with the invention of the novel 
presents itself as fiction, philosophy presents itself as truth.  Refusing to 
accept the multivalent mystery of the bandages, with their ambiguous 
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meanings, modern philosophy insists on finding the body in itself, stripped 
bare.  Whereas modern literature with the birth of the novel gives an ironic 
view of true believers—think of Don Quixote—modern philosophers remain 
true believers.  With their absolute faith in reason, modern philosophers 
from Descartes to Kant ground knowledge and right on reason.  The 
sovereignty of God gives way—barely—to the sovereignty of reason.  
Paradoxically, reason operates according to strict scientific principles of 
accounting such as Descartes’s geometry, which divides space and time into 
infinite units, or Kant’s lex talionis, which demands a punishment equal to 
the crime, all the while being founded on intuition or unreason.  Think of 
Descartes’s clear and distinct ideas or Kant’s claim that in the case of murder 
it is obvious that capital punishment is the right punishment.13  Indeed, the 
intuition that a death for a death is an absolute equivalence—that death, as 
Kant says, is the great equalizer—becomes both the prime example of lex 
talionis and its justification.14 In the case of murder, then, no rational 
calculation is needed because the punishment is obvious.15 Reasoning is 
unnecessary because it is obvious; reason based on intuition.  Reason based 
on faith.  Faith and knowledge, as Derrida suggests, are two sides of the 
same coin, or as Michael Naas puts it, two sides of the same sovereign.16  In 
sum, philosophy continues to look for the sovereign principle, the 
philosophical argument based on pure principles, that is to say, precisely the 
kind of argument Derrida insists is missing when it comes to the abolition of 
the death penalty.   
If we accept Derrida’s claim that there is no principled philosophical 
argument against the death penalty, then it makes sense that he would look 
to literature for abolitionism.  But, what if the principled argument itself is 
part and parcel of the logic of sovereignty that supports the death penalty?  
What if it is the true believers, on both sides of the debate, who threaten the 
worst violence?  What if it is the belief in universal principles itself that gives 
rise to the most dangerous aspect of the most rigorous argument in favor of 
the death penalty?  Of course, in the case of Kant, Derrida turns these very 
principles against Kant’s conclusion in favor of capital punishment to the 
point of suggesting that perhaps Kant’s argument is abolitionist after all 
insofar as the strictness of his criteria against self-interest and for 
equivalence are impossible.  The principled argument, then, is always a 
deconstructible argument.   
If, as he suggests in For What Tomorrow, Derrida is looking for a non-
deconstructible abolitionism, perhaps what he shows is that there is not one.  
Paradoxically, the only philosophical argument for abolition that is immune 
to deconstruction would be a deconstructive argument, but only when it is 
always deconstructing itself.  There is no properly philosophical argument 
against the death penalty and even if there were, it would necessarily follow 
from the same logic supporting the scaffolding of the death penalty.  The 
only properly philosophical abolitionism, then, is not proper at all, but 
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rather the ongoing deconstruction of both principles and arguments on both 
sides of the debate over what is right.  In order to dismantle the scaffolding 
of the death penalty, sovereign principles on both sides must be 
deconstructed.  Derrida’s The Death Penalty Volume 1, shows this much, even 
if it doesn’t say so explicitly.  
Here is an outline of some of Derrida’s implicit, if not explicit, 
arguments against the death penalty:  
1. Insofar as the sovereignty of the sovereign is groundless 
unless grounded on God, there is no non-theological, that 
is to say strictly legal or political, grounding for the state’s 
right to give life or death. Political sovereignty is thus 
grounded on theological sovereignty, which breaches any 
attempts to separate Church and State.  The upshot is that 
the state cannot ground its authority to give and take life 
except by appealing to a higher power.   
2. The law cannot ground itself legally.  The death penalty 
is not only the prime example of this illegitimate and auto-
immune logic whereby the force of law or sovereignty—
“might makes right” —is its only “principle,” but also the 
death penalty is the keystone, the weld, the cement that 
holds it together.  Again, the law necessarily appeals to an 
extra-legal justification for the death penalty, which it 
legitimates through force.  The law itself cannot provide 
an internally coherent argument for capital punishment.  
For example, the law cannot prohibit killing and then give 
itself the legal right to kill.  Alternatively, the law cannot 
justify its own killing without justifying killing more 
generally.   
3. Thus, there is a contradiction at the heart of the 
principle that argues for the death penalty on the basis of 
the sanctity of human life—whoever kills should be killed.  
This principle operates according to an auto-immune logic 
which destroys itself when the state itself violates the 
sanctity of human life by killing.  On this logic, the death 
penalty can only be justified as an exception, in which case 
the law against killing is suspended in the name of law.  
On the other hand, if the death penalty is grounded on the 
exclusively human right to give death, it falls prey to the 
same auto-immune logic. The right to death becomes “the 
law that gives birth to law,” that is, once again, to say, it 
becomes the extra-legal force of law. In sum, there is a 
contradiction at the heart of legal capital punishment. The 
performative force of law, that is to say sovereignty’s 
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claim to the right to give life and death, is always outside 
of the law, extra-legal, illegal, or outlaw.  
4. Moreover, abolition may be a cover for the illegitimacy 
of sovereignty’s claims to control the lives and deaths of 
its citizens, since the death penalty is the most brazen 
example; without it, sovereignty more easily gets away 
with its “might makes right” in the name of democracy, 
freedom, security, etc.  This is to say, abolition of the death 
penalty may operate to conceal the myriad ways in which 
the state sentences individuals and populations to death 
apart from executing them, for example, through 
inadequate health care, poverty, or imprisonment.  
Of course, Derrida complicates matters by demonstrating that even 
modern secular abolitionist literature cannot escape religious imagery and 
appeals to sovereignty, authority and truth, or a beyond life. That is to say 
that it cannot escape identifying the value of human life with something 
beyond this earthly embodied finite existence.  In other words, even secular 
literature cannot resist the appeal of fantasies of controlling or overcoming 
death through, among other things, resurrection.  Redemptive time makes 
its way into literature.  In addition, as if to add insult to injury, secular 
humanism appeals to science as an alternative to redemptive temporality, 
but still in the service of the death penalty.  These humanists, such as Dr. 
Guillotín, put their faith in science to provide an instant, and therefore 
humane and pain free, death that justifies the continued use of capital 
punishment.  Throughout The Death Penalty, volume 1, Derrida suggests that 
the ultimate cruelty of the death penalty is that it disavows earthly 
embodied finite existence and attempts to master the time of death, not just 
through fantasies of resurrection but also with machines, like the guillotine, 
that divide time into moments so infinitesimal that they seemingly do not 
take any time at all.   
The question becomes how to interrupt both redemptive temporality 
and mechanized clock time insofar as they are put into the service of the 
death penalty.  Fantasies of redemption through resurrection trade this life 
for the next and sacrifice finitude to eternal life, while the Cartesian notion 
of time as infinitely divisible into discrete moments perpetuates the fantasy 
of instant death.  Both the time of resurrection and the time of instant death 
stand opposed to the time of life as lived, embodied and finite.  Both are 
attempts to control what cannot be controlled, namely, life and death.  The 
fantasies of eternal life and infinitely divisible instants are constantly trying 
to override what Derrida calls “the principle of indetermination,” by 
determining the time of death and the certainty of an afterlife.  The principle 
of indetermination, as we will see, is a strange principle, an unprincipled 
principle, the interruption of all principled principles.   
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 “Like a detached signifier,” this phrase is itself dangling in Derrida’s 
first session like a temptation or mystery, seemingly detached from his 
musings on those bandages wrapped around the heads or bodies of the 
condemned.  At this very point in the text, an editorial note tells the reader 
that the first session ended one sentence after the passage with which I 
began, when Derrida runs out of time and stops, seemingly abruptly.  The 
end of the lecture comes where he does not expect it, when the clock signals 
time is up.  In a sense, Derrida interrupts himself to stop the lecture before 
he is finished.   
These bandages, then, also flag an odd moment, a sort of limbo, 
between the time of the body speaking and the pages that now signal the 
absence of that body—Derrida’s body—as both dead and yet haunting the 
text with his “notes to self,” so to speak, and various stage cues to guide his 
performance.  These bandages mark a time out of joint, a disjunction, an 
interruption, which signal both the absent body of our author and his 
presence insofar as it haunts the dry leaves of the book, which he both wrote 
and never wrote.17  The leaves of this published book, and phrases, “like a 
detached signifier” are like the bandages, like the scraps, that make us ask 
where the body is.  This moment makes apparent the way in which 
Derrida’s execution, his performance, is subjected to the clock, which 
determines its end.   
Yet, the bandages also mark a repetition.  Derrida repeated verbatim the 
last paragraph of what he presented in the first session at the opening of the 
next session, thus repeating “The bandages envelop, attach, they tie but also 
become detached: They become untied from the body proper.”  The editors 
call this a “disjunction” between the recordings and the typescript when the 
performance of the seminars was out of sync with Derrida’s written versions 
of the seminars up until the third session.18  Suspended, then, between what 
appears in the published text as the “first session” and what appears as the 
“first session continued,” which is really between the first and the second 
meeting of the seminar, are these bandages whose repetition shows up on 
the recordings but is missing, in the published text.  In this book with twelve 
chapters but only eleven sessions, and two sessions “ones,” time is out of 
joint.  This is an odd way of counting, the First Session Continued as 
something in between session one and session two, its strange status 
operating like an interruption of the twelve hour clock, and eventually 
stopping the seminar with the eleventh, the eleventh hour, signaling that 
time is running out, the eleventh hour when that call from the governor 
might come to interrupt the execution and stop the hands of the clock 
ticking mechanically toward the time of death of the condemned.   
This accident of the clock-- Derrida ran out of time to read all of his 
lecture notes—points to some of the most fascinating parts of The Death 
Penalty seminars, namely Derrida’s discussion of time, the death penalty’s 
attempt to control time and end finitude, and the cruelty of the clock as the 
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last and most brutal stroke of state sponsored killing machines.  It becomes 
clear throughout the seminars that for Derrida, it’s about time.  
This time between Derrida’s execution of the lecture and the book that 
is left like so many dried pieces of linen is perhaps the lodgings for an 
abolitionist literature that interrupts the discourse of the death penalty, not 
by providing that much awaited and sought after “principled” or properly 
philosophical argument against the death penalty, but rather by 
“deconstructing” the death penalty with and against the possibility of 
principled or properly philosophical arguments.  In other words, in this text, 
literature appears as an interruption in the discourse of the death penalty 
that, like the bandages, reveals the impossibility of a principled argument 
against the death penalty.  If, as he suggests in For What Tomorrow, Derrida is 
looking for a nondeconstructible abolitionism, perhaps what he shows is 
that one does not exist. There is no properly philosophical principled 
argument against the death penalty, and even if there were, it would 
necessarily follow from the same logic supporting the scaffolding of the 
death penalty.  The only properly philosophical abolitionism, then, is not 
proper at all, but rather the ongoing deconstruction of both principles and 
arguments on both sides of the debate over what is right.  Derrida’s 
execution of The Death Penalty: Volume 1, shows as much, even if it doesn’t 
say so.   
It becomes clear throughout the seminars that for Derrida, it’s about 
time.  The cruelty of the death penalty is about time; more specifically, it 
results from a notion of time that can be measured by the clock, a divisible 
notion of time measured in units, akin to the measurement of units of 
various drugs now used in lethal injections in the US.  Derrida says, “. . . 
what we rebel against when we rebel against the death penalty is not death, 
or even the fact of killing … it is against the calculating decision, not so 
much the ‘you will die’ …..but … you will die on such a such a day, at such 
and such an hour, in that calculable place, and from blows delivered by 
several machines, the worst of which is perhaps neither the guillotine nor 
the syringe, but the clock…”19 The clock, then, is part and parcel of the 
machinery of death and perhaps its most dangerous part.  The death penalty 
kills the condemned, but the logic of the death penalty kills time.   
By cutting up and killing time, this Cartesian logic of divisible units and 
calculation guarantees that the death penalty will continue even after it is 
abolished.  This logic undergirds the fantasy that we can make clean cuts 
between indemnity and condemnation, between humane and cruel, between 
alive and dead.  This logic of divisibility reassures us that we can accurately 
make the cut where it belongs and thereby control the process of death.  And 
this fantasy of control and sovereignty guarantees that, as Derrida says, “the 
death penalty will survive, it will have other lives in front of it, and other 
lives to sink its teeth into.”20 It’s just a matter of time.   
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The logic of calculation kills time in at least two ways.  First, by setting 
the time of death, the death penalty denies the finitude of embodied 
existence.  The death penalty operates with the fantasy that we can control 
the time of death and thereby perhaps death itself.  Second, the modern 
institution of capital punishment, which originates with the invention of the 
guillotine as a more humane way to kill, divides time into discrete moments 
in order to control the time of death down to the instant of death, wherein 
instantaneity becomes the criteria for pain-free and cruelty-free death, such 
that Derrida says “the guillotine is not just a killer, it’s a painkiller.”21It kills 
pain, by killing time, by offering instantaneous death.  The supposed lack of 
time that the condemned spends dying is what makes the execution not 
cruel.  This reasoning holds that if we can identify and locate the instant of 
death and make it take no time, then death is humane.   
The same could be said of lethal injection in the United States, where the 
goal seems to be rendering the condemned unconscious and then killing him 
quickly, as if in his sleep.  The significance of reducing the time spent dying 
and offering instant death is evidenced by reports of so-called “botched” 
executions.  A “botched” execution takes time, whereas a first-rate execution 
takes no time at all.  “Botched,” then, does not refer to execution itself since 
in nearly all of these cases the condemned ends up dead, but rather to the 
time that it takes for the condemned to die.  His suffering, or the cruelty of 
the punishment, is measured in the number of minutes it takes, which is 
why central to every news report of a “botched” execution is the exact 
number of minutes that it took for the condemned to die.  For example, most 
recently, Joseph Rudolph Wood in Arizona, 1 hour and 57 minutes;  Clayton 
Lockett in Oklahoma, 43 minutes; Dennis McGuire in Ohio, 25 minutes; 
William Happ in Florida, 14 minutes, etc.22 
A so-called “botched” execution reminds us that we cannot control the 
time of death and moreover that dying takes time.  Even as cruelty is 
measured in clock time, botched execution pulls back the blinds on our 
inability to give instant pain free death, our inability to kill time.  In this 
regard, last month when the wardens pulled the curtains on the windows 
around the death chamber when Clayton Lockett’s execution went wrong, 
those blinds both covered up what was going on behind them and revealed 
our inability to control death or the time of death.   These curtains around 
the death chamber act as bandages, blindfolds, which cover over cruelty as 
part of what Derrida calls the anesthetic logic of contemporary capital 
punishment.  And yet, as Derrida asks, speaking again of Christ, how do we 
measure the agony of the condemned?  As the minutes ticking away in 
every botched execution pull back the blinds on the inadequacy of 
measuring suffering in terms of clock time, they point back to the 
incalculable time of the empty bandages, the time of interruption, the 11th 
hour, that promises to stop the clock before it’s too late.    
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